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Abstract. Previous research of Terminal Radar Control Facilities and Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement Systems interactions by the authors examined how combined NextGen digitized technology affects air trafﬁc controller
functions. Applying their updated SHELL model, human factors implications on
the Tower Team before and after implementing NextGen technology were
examined, focusing on cognitive loading and automated functions affecting each
team member. A survey examined where cognitive difﬁculties occur when
controllers are responsible for multiple screen views, remote airﬁelds or helipads, and digitized cameras and blind spots. Scanning challenges were identiﬁed
where local trafﬁc, ground operations, and data converge onto one screen, and
when attention is diverted to distant screens. Also studied were automatic aircraft handoffs and potential for missed handoffs, and, assessing changes from
voice communication to text messaging for human error. Findings indicated a
necessity for controllers to manage balanced tasking, vigilance pacing, and
resource management.
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1 Introduction and Intent of the Study
The Next Generation (NextGen) air trafﬁc control system for the United States (U.S.) is
continuing to implement new technology to accommodate growth of the aviation
industry. New control tower equipment and operations by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) may affect the airport environment and invites closer examination. This study assessed the FAA Tower Team concept [1] and how air trafﬁc
controller cognition is affected in relation to the new technology. Intended gains in
safety and efﬁciency for tower teams could be offset by human error relative to cognitive loading. This is evident in national runway incursion data indicating that tower
controllers are the primary cause of runway incursions 18% of the time [2]. Controller
incursion error can lead to deadly aviation accidents like at LAX in 1991 when a USAir
Boeing 737 landed on a SkyWest commuter on an active runway at night destroying
both aircraft and fatally injuring 12 people [3].
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2 Tower Team Analysis Before Computer Automation
The SHELL model by Hawkins [4] used a simple block layout. The tower controller is
represented here by the L (Liveware) in the center and surrounded by four other human
factors interfaces: S (Software), H (Hardware), E (Environment) and L (Liveware).
The model for the tower control team in Fig. 1 had four working positions where
each job encompassed a SHELL component. The data controller’s main job in the S-L
and H-L connection was to complete flight strips with departing aircraft information.
The E-L interface required controllers to update the flight strips with new information.
The task was completed in the L-L team linkage by passing the flight strips to ground
controllers. In the S-L interface the ground control position had jurisdiction over all
aircraft taxiing for takeoff. The H-L connection required that ground control use line of
sight and could be aided by ground radar in low visibility. Critical radio communications in clearance directions between ground control, aircraft and ground vehicles
were the key to situational awareness in the E-L linkage. Once the aircraft was near the
runway, the ground controller would coordinate through radio in the L-L team interface
for the aircraft to switch to local control. The tower local controller followed procedures in the S-L interface to safely direct all aircraft for takeoff and landing. This
included standardized phraseology and adherence to separation distances for wake
turbulence. Regarding the H-L interface, the local controller depended on clear, concise
radio communications through the tower radio with all aircraft and line of sight visual
contact to the aircraft. This required a high degree of situational awareness in the E-L
interface with the local controller constantly scanning the airspace and runway. In the
L-L team connection, the local controller needed to be aware of ground control and
incoming trafﬁc from approach control. The tower supervisor was responsible for the
actions of each position in the S-L interface. This included oversight of shift changeovers and backing up inexperienced controllers. In the H-L connection the tower
supervisor listened to all radios and backed up all taxiway and runway operations. In
the E-L interface the supervisor managed trafﬁc flow and unexpected emergencies. The
supervisor led the team by employing effective communications in the L-L team
connection. With different tower positions and limited technology, teamwork and
training were essential. Several tenants similar to aircraft CRM (Crew Resource
Management) were employed to ensure the team remained connected in the L-L team
relationship. Teamwork was an FAA priority. Good communication consisting of
standardized aviation phrases and careful listening supported the teamwork.
Assertiveness was valued in promoting each team member to speak up. Most importantly, the tower team remained focused on ensuring good situational awareness. The
old model relied on training that was supported by a progressive hierarchy starting at
the data controller position and moving up to supervisor. The training mandated that
each tower position ﬁrst had to qualify as an instructor at that position before moving
up. In this system a model airport was set up and supervisors used model aircraft to
physically simulate aircraft moving about the airﬁeld while trainees learned the controller positions.
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Fig. 1. Tower Controller Human Factors (HF) SHELL analysis based on the model by Hawkins
[4] modiﬁed to depict the Liveware-Liveware team interface.

3 Tower Team Analysis After Computer Automation
In 2020 the ATC tower has been transformed with digital information and automation
for the NextGen system. In Fig. 2 the SHELL 2016 model [5] is updated to account for
digitization and crowded interfaces ﬁlled with technology. In doing so the previous
SHELL model of separate tower positions from Fig. 1 becomes one SHELL as the
technology causes all four tower control positions to superimpose upon each other. The
same tower positions exist, although technology is transforming the positions into a
tighter overlapping team. The automated systems create clouds of technology to replace
the direct SHELL linkage interfaces in Fig. 1, thus causing all four linkages of the
SHELL to become concatenated. The impact of these technologies on the four tower
controllers starts with the S-L interface cloud employing an automated information
device known as VIDS (Visual Information Display System). This computer houses all
the information relative to tower operations and each controller has their own VIDS to
access the same information. The data controller uses it to input the aircraft flight strip
data into the National Airspace System while also updating the ADIS (Aviation Data
Integration System) information regarding weather, wind data, airﬁeld status, and
detailed airﬁeld operations data. Lastly, it has a digital feed from the airﬁeld lighting
system and digital video cameras systems that monitor the airﬁeld blind spots and
remote airﬁeld operations. In the H-L connection the main hardware in the cloud is the
STARS CTRD (Certiﬁed Tower Radar Display) and keyboard. A crucial approach
control system for NextGen, STARS (Standard Terminal Automation Replacement),
has been added to the control tower displays. Visible to all tower controllers, it depicts
flight information of aircraft near or in the control tower’s airspace. With STARS, the
TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach Control) controller can hand off aircraft automatically to the tower local controller. The STARS display increases situational
awareness and enables the tower to reduce wake turbulence separation minimums. This
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enables controllers to expedite takeoffs and landings and reduce aircraft fuel cost. Other
hardware in the H-L cloud includes the FIDO (Flight Data Input Operation) flight strip
printer, the airﬁeld lighting system and the digital video camera system. The E-L
interface now incorporates technologies that overlap from H-L and S-H clouds
allowing controllers to manage the environment better. The STARS screen enables all
controllers to be situationally aware of aircraft and to locate them visually. The digital
video cameras can be monitored by any controller on the VIDS. Through the lighting
system certain taxiway lighting or runway lighting can be adjusted. The L-L cloud also
feeds into the E-L interface. The Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch (ETVS) creates a
tighter overlapping team of tower controllers. All four controllers have an ETVS
terminal. Each controller uses one frequency and monitors other controllers’ frequencies with touch screens. This enables ground and data controllers to work on the
primary ground frequency while monitoring the local controller on the tower frequency. The tower supervisor monitors ground and tower frequencies and has overriding authority. Team members can talk freely, but the ﬁnal radio call outbound is
always recorded.

Fig. 2. NextGen Tower Controller Human Factors SHELL Analysis 2020 based on the SHELL
2016 [5] updated for computer information and automation.

4 Other Factors Influencing the Tower Team in 2020
Technology maximizes gains in CRM teamwork from better communications,
assertiveness and increased situational awareness. These precepts are further enhanced
in a more realistic case study training environment by recordings of incidents from
other towers. The training method of qualifying as an instructor in each position has
helped ensure that controllers thoroughly understand the different technologies. The

Assessing Cognitive Processing and Human Factors Challenges

293

most dramatic shift in training from the past is use of a high-ﬁdelity tower simulator.
All the positions are equipped with a similar layout of equipment found in the operating
tower. The difference is that the simulator tower windows are a realistic virtual view of
the airﬁeld.

5 The Next Big Step in NextGen Tower Controller
Development
Future elements of the NextGen system in the form of ASSC (Airport Surface
Surveillance Capability), CPDLC (Controller Pilot Data Link Communications) and
more remote digital videos are coming. The ASSC currently is being tested in the form
of ASDE X (using ADS-B out) at 35 major U.S. airports. It would allow the Tower
Team to know exactly where all aircraft and ground vehicles are and provide oral
warnings of potential runway incursions or ground collisions, however, it adds another
display screen to monitor. CPDLC already has proven an effective way to text
Departure Clearances to aircraft, but it raises a concern that when used with current
communications it may prove distracting for controllers. Digital videos now are used
by controllers to monitor blind spots and remote airﬁelds, but the concern remains as to
how many extra videos controllers can monitor before their critical scan of the airﬁeld
is compromised. These human factors issues invite evaluation from a human cognition
perspective.

6 Cognitive Processing Challenges
As seen with the evolution of air trafﬁc control and incorporating new technologies,
different behaviors and tasks have modiﬁed the cognitive processing challenges for
operators. Currently in many air trafﬁc centers, controllers are working simultaneously
with existing legacy systems and newer NextGen systems [6]. The cognitive requirements to sustain reliable performance become complex and exclusionary. The authors
previously have examined ATC TRACON and STARS functions and discovered
cognitive processing limitations and potential areas for closer study that address
attention, distraction, and cognitive overload [7]. The Tower Team concept, as
established by the FAA [1], further increases situational awareness and cognitive
loading. With increasing trafﬁc loads, and tower involvement in runway incursions,
concentrated attention on these and other concerns bears immediate assessment for
feasible remedies.
Explained earlier, the FAA Tower Team performs three separate, interrelated
functions as an integral unit. Team controllers work with the VIDS displaying four
separate screens depicting local air trafﬁc, ground environment, data and communications, and remote cameras on the airﬁeld, runway crossings, and helipads. In some
locations, controllers direct air trafﬁc operations at multiple remote airﬁelds. Although a
controller is not responsible for all the activity seen, they are exposed to it in their
continuous scan of VIDS. Controllers also are aware of blind spots in the vicinity that
are not captured by cameras or sensors [8]. In addition, they monitor all other
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transactions conducted by controllers with different assigned tasks. Combined, these
engage substantial cognitive processing resources. Consequently, while scanning displays, something that distracts attention and delays their scan can disrupt a train of
thought. The potential for conflict or confusion is evident and invites possible overload,
even in nominal conditions. A major potential for distraction is when controllers must
move to view the large screen mounted above them displaying STARS information.

7 Cognitive Overload
Given the operating environment within the Tower Team, several potential overload
situations can arise. With each controller visually scanning all functions, when an
unanticipated event occurs they may be uncertain which controller takes the lead. Or, if
an anomaly is detected in one of the remote locations, that can disrupt the scan and
prospective memory or deferred actions awaiting execution. Where action requires
intervention of the supervisor (who can override a controller at any time), this might
draw the immediate attention of remaining controllers and divert their scans. Where
conditions are nominal, operators can usually function effectively. It is when an
emergency or unanticipated event occurs, for example an unauthorized runway
crossing, that cognitive overload is likely [9]. Consequences can seriously degrade
controller performance.
To assess the potential for cognitive loading issues, a convenience survey (10
items) was administered to 20 Tower Team controllers. Complete results will be
published separately. Preliminary ﬁndings indicated sometimes or often 75% needed to
shift attention, 60% required added time to assess status when re-engaging, and 40%
found monitoring digital videos (e.g., remote airﬁelds, helipads, blind spots) intruded
upon attention to other tasks. When encountering a diversion from their primary screen,
75% experienced confusion, and, experienced stress in the team environment. However, 85% believed automation did not add to their workload. In a different vein, 85%
indicated an automated ground display with warnings of potential collisions or
incursions would be of value. Expecting additional NextGen technology regarding
digital texting to aircraft, 45% indicated they prefer texting to radios, although 75%
believed it would be of beneﬁt as support. The survey results indicate two clear
outcomes - ﬁrst, that there are substantial opportunities for distraction and confusion in
the Tower Team environment. And second, controllers are conﬁdent in their abilities to
manage growing technology applications and they welcome added functions to
improve communications. In part, this conﬁdence may be attributed to the advanced
training simulators and requirements to operate in each of the positions on the Team.
However, the obvious disparity lies in the juxtaposition of these two ﬁndings.
As NextGen progresses, new functions and technology, including expanded texting, will arrive. Although limited in practice currently, the use of ADSE-X when
implementing ASSC and CPDLC are prime examples of advanced technologies added
to controller scan. To achieve balanced tasking and to maintain vigilance of critical
functions, implications for CRM tailored for the Tower Team environment are evident.
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8 Summary
In the transition from legacy tower operations to continuing development of the Next
Gen Tower Team, the potential for disrupted cognitive processing and eventual cognitive overload become clear. As indicated, the functions of local trafﬁc, ground
operations, and data transfer and communications are successively building the cognitive processing demands and suggesting thresholds for cognitive overload. As more
NextGen functions are implemented, a close examination of effects on controllers is
apparent. Likewise, the positive results of superior training and equipment needs to be
assessed for possible lessons learned that may apply to other aviation functions.
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